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Article 7

REMOVAL AND RESTRAINT OF CONTUMACIOUS DEFENDANTS
I.

Introduction

The current advent of the violent, disruptive, obstreperous defendant has
challenged some of the concepts implicit in the administration of the judicial
process. The most severe challenge seems to be directed at the dignity, decorum,
and courtesy which have been the hallmark of the courts of civilized nations.
This challenge has raised serious questions about the premises upon which the
court's rules are founded.
An accused's contumacious conduct places a court in the dilemma of attempting to preserve two otherwise unopposing interests: the right of the defendant to be present to confront witnesses and the right of the court to maintain
the dignity and order of the judicial process in the face of misconduct. This Note
analyzes the development of these two interests and shows their culmination in
the recent case of Illinois v. Allen. The story is not complete, however, for neither
Allen nor any other case provides the trial judge with any "black letter" law in
regard to what should be done with any individual, disruptive defendant. All
that can be given are guidelines; there is a large grey area within which individual judgment can only be applied in each case.
II.

The Right To Be Present at Trial-Its
Historical Evolution

The origin of the right to be present in felony prosecutions is found in the
early trial practice in England. The common methods of English trial were
Trial by Ordeal and Trial by Battle.'
Trial by Ordeal took two basic forms: fire ordeal and water ordeal. The
former was restricted to persons of high rank while the latter was for the common
people. Basically, fire ordeal consisted of the accused taking a piece of red-hot
iron in his hand or walking barefoot and blindfolded over nine red-hot ploughshares.' Water ordeal required the accused to either plunge his bare arm up to
the elbow in boiling water or be thrown into a pond and sink.' The requirement for innocence in either fire or water ordeal was that the accused escape
unhurt. If the accused was injured by the ordeal-as was most likely without
some collusion-he was condemned as guilty.
Trial by Battle was an opportunity for the accused to prove his innocence by
engaging in combat and emerging victorious. The theory behind such a "trial"
was that God would always intervene to preserve innocence and vindicate the
guiltless by protecting them from harm.4
With such a system of adjudicating the case, the presence of the accused was

1
2
3
4

HELLER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 4-12 (1951).
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *342-43.

Id. at 343.
Id. at 346.
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indispensable for a verdict. Without the accused, there would be no ordeal or
battle,, nor could there be any determination of guilt or innocence. 5
From this rough origin as a crude limitation upon private war, English
criminal justice evolved to the tyrannical Star Chamber proceedings. Trial by
jury gained undisputed supremacy after the civil wars of England, but the trials
themselves only proved that juries could be as unjust as the Star Chamber.'
However, changes instituted in 1640 indicated a significant shift in the spirit of
criminal justice toward a more humane trial that was more conducive to the
discovery of truth. From this time it could be said:
In every case... the accused person had the witnesses against him produced
face to face, unless there was some 7special reason (such as sickness) to
justify the reading of their depositions.
Inherent in this recognition of the right to confront witnesses was the necessity of
the mutual presence of the accused and the witnesses against him. No legislative
enactment prompted this procedural change. It appears to have been a spontaneous reaction to the abuses present in the political trials of the preceding century.'
The institution of the jury system strengthened the original basis for the
requirement of the accused's presence. It was essential for the accused to present
the dispute, accept the jurisdiction of the court, and defend.9 Since he was accorded no right to counsel he had to present the dispute and defend as only he
could. The jurisdictional aspect was particularly significant because the common
law court came to regard the accused's submission to the court's jurisdiction as
a prerequisite to the commencement and continuation of the trial. In England
it was also necessary that the accused accept the authority and capacity of the
judge. Pragmatically, the courts were cognizant of the potential embarrassment
and futility of decreeing punishment on an absent defendant. In felony cases,
there were problems of execution of judgment that were not present in cases
where the judgment could be satisfied from the defendant's property.
A statute passed in 1695 marked the first time the accused was permitted to
have a lawyer assist him in defending against charges of treason."0 Yet even after
the institution of the right to counsel, presence was still rigorously required. This
was based more on lack of precedent to continue in his absence than on any desire
to protect the accused. As stated by Holt:
Judgment cannot be given against any man in his absence, for a corporal
punishment; he must be present when it is done .... There is no precedent
of any such entry; for if we give judgment that he shall be put in the pillory,
5 Goldin, Presence of the Defendant at Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases, 16
COLUM. L. REv. 18 (1916). The types of cases in which ordeal was inflicted are set out in 2
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF

ENGLAND

252-53 (1883). In appears that

ordeal fell into disuse in the course of the thirteenth century.
6 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 425-26 (1883).

7 Id. at 358.
8 Id.

9 Goldin, supra note 5, at 19.
10 Clark, The Sixth Amendment and the Law of the Land, 8 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (1963).
It was not until 1836 that the right to counsel was extended to other felonies. In that 141year span, the best protection the accused received was the aid his physical countenance gave to
the confrontation with his accusers and the witnesses against him.
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it might be demanded when, and the answer would be, when they can catch
him."'
At the time of the establishment of the American colonies, the principle of
confrontation was firmly entrenched as an integral part of the common law.
And when the Union was formed, the new states declared their right to use the
common law of England. The declaration of rights or the state constitution of
most of the new states enumerated, as one of the rights of its citizens, the right of
an accused in a criminal proceeding to be confronted with the witnesses against
him. 2 The concept of presence, although not stated with particularity, was
understood to be included in the term "confrontation." The term conveyed more
than merely the right to cross-examine witnesses. At the time of the adoption of
the sixth amendment the term appears to have been so well understood as to
require little or virtually no explanation of the phrase "to be confronted with his
accuser and the witnesses against him."' 3 Historically, all that can be discerned
is that the clause was part of Madison's proposed amendments. 4 Thus, the
Federal Constitution does not expressly confer upon the defendant the right to
be present at his trial.'" However, the fact that the word "presence" is not used
explicitly can be historically justified on the basis of the accepted understanding
and usage of the confrontation principle at common law.
One of the first American cases to expressly recognize the presence requirement was Sperry v. Commonwealth." In that case the court announced that the
rule applicable to trials for felonies in England was, in general, also applicable in
Virginia.' Subsequent courts rigidly and blindly adhered to this principle.'"
However, the important factor was overlooked that American courts had long
recognized the right to counsel. An accused in America had greater assurance of
protection by virtue of having counsel than an accused in England. Although the
peculiarly English reason for adopting the rule was missing, the adherence to
established principles nevertheless assured the adoption of the rule.
The uniformity of the American decisions on the necessity of defendant's
presence leaves no doubt that it was the general rule. 9 This did not, however,
prevent the courts from recognizing exceptions to the confrontation right that
had existed both before and after the adoption of the sixth amendment. The right
to confrontation did not bar the admission of dying declarations,"0 documentary

11 Duke's Case, 90 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1701).
12 HELLER, supra note 1, at 21-24. See the Declaration of Rights-of Maryland, Virginia
Bill of Rights.
13 DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 37 (1957); HELLER supra note 1, at 27-34. See
generally RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1955).
14 RUTLAND, supra note 13, at 202.
15 ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (1939).
16

33 Am.Dec. 261 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1838).

18

See, e.g., State v. Outs, 30 La. Ann. 1155, 1156 (1878).

17 Id.

19 The following state cases all strongly indicate the accused's right to be present at felony
trials: Cook v. State, 60 Ala. 39 (1877); Sneed v. State, 5 Ark. 431 (1844); Barton v. State,
241 (1882); McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39
67 Ga. 653 (1887); Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill.
(1860); People v. Perkins, 1 Wend. 91 (N.Y. 1828); Rose v. State, 20 Ohio 31 (1851).
20 State v. Bethea, 241 S.C. 16, 126 S.E.2d 846 (1962). See also Campbell v. State, 11
Ga.353 (1852); People v.Corey, 157 N.Y. 332, 51 N.E. 1024 (1898).
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evidence, 2 or the affidavit of witnesses whose absence was due to the defendant's
wrongful procurement. 2 The theory behind these exceptions was that the defendant sihould not be able to complain about the legitimate consequences of his
own actions.' - Valid jurisdictional arguments, such as execution of the verdict in
a capital case on an absent defendant, were advanced to support the rule of
presence,24 but other grounds were also promulgated.2 5
1 Gradually the courts began to recognize that the privilege, being primarily
for defendant's benefit, could be waived in cases of felonies that invcolved less than
capital offenses. 6 It was also recognized that where the trial was for a misdemeanor it could usually take place and a verdict could be rendered in the
defendant's absence.2" Some courts indicated that it was possible for a conviction to stand if the accused had missed only insignificant steps in the trial by his
absence. The distinction was made, however, that the trial must have been commenced and that the prisoner, by his own wrong
(e.g., not returning for trial
28
when on bail), abandoned the case to counsel.
Hopt v. Utah29 was a felony case in which certain challenges to the competency of the jurors were tried in the absence of the prisoner, but with his knowledge and without objection on his part. The Court held that the action of the
lower court in permitting the trial of these challenges in the absence of the
defendant, regardless of his failure to object, was such a vital error as to vitiate
the proceedings. The Court indicated that neither the accused nor his counsel
had the power to waive the right to be present. Mr. Justice Harlan noted that:
The public has an interest in his [the accused's] life and liberty. Neither can
be lawfully taken except in the mode prescribed by law. That which the
law makes essential in proceedings involving the deprivation of life or liberty
cannot be dispensed with or affected by the consent of the accused, much less
by his mere failure, when on trial and in custody, to object to unauthorized
methods.... [T]he legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of
one whose 'life or liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he
shall be personally present at the trial, that is, at every stage of the trial when
his substantial rights may be affected by the proceedings against him. If he
be deprived of his life or liberty without being so present, such deprivation
would be without that due process of law required by the Constitution. 0
Justice Harlan also indicated that the accused must be afforded the con21

People v. Purcell, 22 Cal. App.2d 126, 70 P.2d 706 (1937); Tucker v. People, 122 Ill.

583, 13 N.E. 809 (1887); People v. Jones, 24 Mich. 214 (1872).

22

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

23 Gore v. State, 52 Ark. 285, 12 S.W. 564 (1889).
24 Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115, S.E. 679 '(1923).
25 State v. Hughes, 2 Ala. 102, 36 Am. Dec. 411 (1841).
26 Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill. 241 (1882); McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39 (1860); Price
v. State, 36 Miss. 531, 72 Am. Dec. 195 (1858); State v. Cherry, 154 N.C. 624, 70 S.E. 294
(1911); Wilson v. State, 2 Ohio St. 319 (1853); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 189, 32
Am. Rep. 445, (1879); Hill v. State, 17 Wis. 675, 86 Am. Dec. 738 (1864).

27

United States v. Mayo, 26 F. Cas. 1230 (No. 15754) (C.C. Mass. 1853); People v.

Budd, 57 Cal. 349 (1881); Holliday v. People, 4 Ill. 76 (1847); State v. Young, 86 Iowa
406, 53 N.W. 272 (1892); State v. Lucker, 40 S.C. 549 (18.93); Gage v. State, 9 Tex. Crim.
259 (1880).
"
28 Fight v. State, 7 Ohio, Part 1, 180, 28 Am. Dec. 626 (1835). See also Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Gore v. State, 52 Ark. 285, 12 S.W. 564 (1889).
29 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
30 Id. at 579.
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frontation right from the commencement of the trial. The Court considered the
trial to begin from the point of jury selection. The aid which the accused's
presence would give to his counsel, the court, and his triers in a matter directly
affecting his life or liberty was emphasized. 3' It was recognized that his counsel
alone could not adequately defend in his absence.
The Court seemed to uphold an inviolate rule of presence that commenced
at jury selection and extended through the examination of witnesses, the argument of counsel,3" the rendition of the verdict, 3 and the discharge of the jury. 4
At any significant part of the trial the defendant had to be present, but his
absence while some insignificant, collateral thing was being done was not necessarily fatal to the court's jurisdiction.
The Hopt principles were strengthened through the strong affirmation of
5 In that case the
the presence requirement rendered in Lewis v. United States."
right was held to be so absolute that the accused could not waive it either
personally or through his counsel. Additionally, the trial record had to indicate
the presence of the accused at all essential parts of the trial in order to assure
the appellate court that the accused was afforded this substantial right. The
making of challenges to the jurors was regarded as an essential part of the trial
at which the accused had the right to be brought face to face with the jurors. A
secret challenge made out of the presence of the accused was reversible error.
The strengthening of the ability to waive the right to be present was due,
in part, to the emasculation of the jurisdictional basis for the argument for
absolute presence. Although some courts continued to cling to the rule on the
jurisdictional grounds, 6 the Supreme Court in Diaz v. United States 7 recognized
that a defendant did have the ability to waive his right to be present. The Court
considered a statute from the Philippine Islands which was stated to be the substantial equivalent of the sixth amendment. The defendant's voluntary, temporary
absence from his trial was construed to operate "as a waiver of his right to be
present [which] leaves the court free to proceed with the trial in like manner
and with like effect as if he were present."3 8 The old fear of rendering an unenforceable judgment on an absent defendant that was prominent from English
precedent was thrust aside. The new rule deprived the accused of the ability to
frustrate the court personally, and justice in general, by fleeing the jurisdiction in
order to render the court powerless to deliver an adverse verdict. Quoting from
Falk v. United States, 9 the Court noted:
Neither in criminal nor in civil cases will the law allow a person to take
31

Id. at 578.

32 Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 517 (1876); Bearden v. State, 49 Ark. 331 (1884); State v.
Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582 (1901).
33 Tiller v. State, 96 Ga. 431 (1895) ; Rose v. State, 20 Ohio 31 (1851).
34 See note 19 supra. See also Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107 (1855) where, after rendition
of the verdict, the judge noticed defendant's absence. Although he had discharged the jury,
he told them they were not discharged before they left the jury box, and then had the defendant
brought in and the verdict received again.
35 146 U.S. 370 (1892).
36 State v. Mannion, 19 Utah 505, 57 P. 542 (1899); Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va.
600, 115 S.E. 679 (1923).
37 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
38 Id. at 455.
39 15 App. D.C. 446 (1899), aff'd, 180 U.S. 636 (1901).
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advantage of his own wrong. And yet this would be precisely what it would
do if it permitted an escape from prison, or an absconding from the jurisdiction while at large 40on bail, during the pendency of a trial before a jury, to
operate as a shield.
Diaz thus ameliorated the strict rule promulgated in Hopt and Lewis-at least
in cases where the charge was a non-capital offense and the accused was not in
custody.
In Snyder v.Massachusetts41 the Court was called upon to determine
whether the presence of the accused was required at a jury view. It was held that
there was no absolute right to be present at a bare inspection by the jury. A bare
inspection is a view where nothing was said by anyone to direct the attention of
the jury to one feature or another. The Court assumed that the sixth amendment
right to confront and examine one's accusers was "reinforced by the Fourteenth
Amendment, though this has not been squarely held.1 42 It was pointed out that
there was no prior ruling which guaranteed the right to be present when presence
would be useless. The presence of the accused constituted a condition of due
process only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his
absence.43
The Court went significantly beyond recognizing the ability to miss certain
unimportant parts of the trial. In a footnote, Justice Cardozo classified the statements in Hopt and Lewis on presence as dicta.44 He recognized that the right to
be present was not absolute as stated in the previous cases. The Lewis holding
was further diminished when it was noted that the case dealt with the rule as it
existed at common law.45
With the rendering of the Snyder opinion the state of the law reached the
point where a defendant did not necessarily have to be present for his entire trial.
He could voluntarily consent to a waiver of his constitutional right to be present
at stages of the trial at which collateral matters occurred. However, the requirement of presence was still a significant force; presence was mandated whenever
evidence was offered to enable defendant to advise with his counsel48 as well as
cross-examine his accusers."
III. The Right To Be Present at
Trial-Waiver by Misconduct
The early English common law right to be present at one's trial was conditioned upon one's continued proper conduct throughout the trial. The degree
of misconduct justifying removal was necessarily lower in misdemeanor cases
40 223 U.S. at 458.
41 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
42 Id. at 106. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) which held that the sixth
amendment right is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
43 Id. at 107-08. See also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) which held that allowing a waiver in a capital case is not repugnant to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
44 Id. at 117.
45 Id.

46 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
47

Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
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than in felony cases because of the force of the rule of confrontation in capital
cases. The jurisdictional arguments were of primary importance in the felony
cases because of the lack of "property" that suitable punishment could be levied
on. The removal sanction was, however, so rarely invoked that a famous English
commentator remarked:
I have never known or heard of this being done, but Lord Cranworth (then
Rolfe, B.) threatened to have Rush removed from Court, at his trial for
murder at Norwich in 1849, if he persisted in a singularly indecent and outrageous course of cross-examination ....[I]t is obvious that in capital cases,
or indeed, in any trial involving severe punishment, almost any measures,
short of removing the prisoner, should be resorted to.48
The English experience was not, therefore, of substantial aid to the evolving
American law of waiver by misconduct.
The first American case to deal with the problem of a disruptive defendant
was United States v. Davis49 where the defendant persisted in interrupting the
district attorney's opening address. The defendant succeeded in making it impossible for the trial to proceed with dignity and decorum. The judge had the
defendant removed from the courtroom to an adjoining room. Defendant's
counsel had free access to this room at all times during the proceedings. When
Davis had calmed himself and decided to behave, he was permitted to enter the
courtroom and rejoin the trial. As to his motion for a new trial based on his
exclusion from the courtroom, it was stated:
He was absent during a part of the opening, only because of his own disorderly conduct. It does not lie in his mouth to complain of the order which
was made necessary by his own misconduct, and which he could at any time
have terminated by signifying his willingness to avoid creating disturbance.50
Thus, the seldom, if ever, 5 ' used English rule was established in American
practice. This case did not, however, cite the sixth amendment to enforce or
modify any provision contained therein. The absence of authority for such a
move is indicated by the lack of citation to any precedent or other source for such
extreme action.
The chronologically next important case in this area arose, ironically, in
England twenty-eight years later with Regina v. Berry.5 2 At his arraignment for
the felony of burglary the accused proceeded to remove his clothing, and wildly
shout and blaspheme so as to make it necessary for the court to have him removed
from the courtroom. After a repetition of this performance the next day, he was
again removed after which the court entered on his behalf a plea of not guilty.
He was found guilty and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Although this
was not a capital felony case, it was still an unprecedented act in a felony-case.
Relying upon the authority of Regina v. Berry, the court in Rex v. Browne5"
A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF CRImINAL PROCEDURE 194 n.1 (1883).
25 F. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869).

48
49

STEPHEN,

50
51
52
53

Id. at 774.
See note 48 supra.
104 L.T.J. 110 (Northampton Assizes 1897).
70 J.P. 472 (1906).
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convicted an absent defendant. The female accused in this misdemeanor case
threw herself down on the floor, and otherwise so misbehaved as to make it impossible to continue the trial in her presence. She was ultimately convicted and
sentenced to eighteen months in prison. The case was recognized to stand for
the proposition that only in exceptional circumstances could a defendant be excluded even from a misdemeanor case. 4 This case also serves to highlight the
standing of Regina v. Berry as the sole precedent and authority for the proposition
that a defendant can forfeit his right to be present at a felony trial for extreme
misconduct.
IV. Decorum in the Courtroom Versus the Defendant's Right To Be
Present at Trial-The Use of Physical Restraints as an Alternative to Removal
With the conjunction of the rules of presence and forfeiture of presence
through misconduct, the search for reasonable alternatives to removal centered
on the concept of enforced presence through physical restraint. Once again, the
American common law precedent was the English experience. The general rule
announced by Blackstone was that if there was danger of escape the accused
could be restrained by leg irons, but otherwise he was to remain unshackled."
In (ranburne's Case in 1696"6 the defendant was brought, after arraignment, to the bar in irons. Chief Justice Holt ordered his irons removed on the
ground that the prisoner ought to stand and plead at ease when tried. A distinction was made in 1722 in Layer's Case5" that the prisoner might be brought to
the bar in irons for arraignment, but that his shackles must be removed at trial.
It was unsuccessfully argued that on arraignment, as at trial, the dignity of the
court should be considered. At the highest court, "where the King himself is
supposed to be personally present, to have a man plead for his life before them
in chains, seems very unsuitable." 8 Although it was recognized that chains are
burdensome and must be removed at trial, it was decided that at the arraignment
the accused may be kept in chains. The primary reason for this was to prevent
the.prisoner's escape.
The American courts adopted a similar attitude toward the use of shackles
at a trial. The court in People v. Harrington" expressed the accepted view that:
[Any order or action of the court which, without evident necessity, imposes
physical burdens, pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of
his trial, inevitably tends to confuse and embarrass his niental faculties, and
thereby materially to abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights
of defense; and especially would such physical bonds and restraints in like
manner materially impair and prejudicially affect his statutory privilege of
becoming a competent witness and testifying in his own behalf.60
54 See, e.g., The King v. Lee Kuhn, 1 K.B. 337, 341 (1915).
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *322. See also STEPHEN, A DIGEST

55

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 194 (1883).

56 13 How. St. Tr. 222.
57 16 How. St. Tr. 94.
58 Id. at 99.
59 42 Cal. 165, 10 Am. Rep. 296 (1871).
60 Id. at 167, 10 Am. Rep. at 298.
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The general rule today is that the accused is entitled to make his initial appearance free from all forms of restraint." There is, however, no absolute rule
that a prisoner can in no case be fettered. 2
Many courts state that special facts or exceptional circumstances have to be
found to justify the use of shackles and gags. 3 Shackling is excused only when it
is necessary to prevent the escape or self-destruction of the prisoner, to prevent
probable danger to the officers of the court, or to protect bystanders from violence.
It is also permissible where the defendant engages in such misconduct as would
obstruct the business of the court.6 4
In People v. Loomis65 misconduct by the defendant resulted in the court's
ordering that defendant's arms and legs be strapped together while he was
secured in a wheelchair. At times a towel was placed over his mouth to preclude
outbursts. Such measures were necessary because the accused kept throwing
himself on the floor, kicking the counsel's table, screaming profanities at the
court and jury, and fighting with the officers who sought to restrain and quiet
him. No abuse of the trial court's discretion in ordering such restraints was found.
Gagging and shackling two defendants was also upheld in United States v.
Bentvena 6 One defendant had climbed into the jury box and shoved jurors.
Another defendant heaved a chair at an Assistant United States Attorney. The
court approved the imposition of restraint saying: "If any one distinct impression
is gained from a scrutiny of the record here, it is that the trial judge was justified,
indeed was forced, to resort to stern measures to obtain order in his courtroom." ' T
Problems may arise in cases where several defendants engage in a course of
action designed to make it impossible to proceed with the trial while other defendants do not participate in the actions. In People v. Duplissey s several defendants refused to be seated in the courtroom and persisted in interrupting the judge.
Although one defendant did not participate in the disruptive actions, all the
defendants were handcuffed together in the presence of the jury. It was held that
this shackling was so prejudicial to the nondisruptive defendant as to render
denial of his motion for a separate trial an abuse of judicial discretion.
Similar difficulties arise where one defendant's witnesses are manacled. A
defendant has the right to have his witnesses unmanacled for the same basic
reasons that he is allowed the free use of his own limbs.69
Although a defendant's misconduct at trial is recognized as an adequate
61 See, e.g., Odell v. Hudspeth, 189 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1951); Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74
(1877); State v. Randolph, 99 Ariz. 253, 408 P.2d 397 (1965); State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn.
384, 97 N.W.2d 472 (1959); State v. Temple, 194 Mo. 237, 92 S.W.869 (1906); Commonwealth v. Reid, 123 Pa. Super. 459, 187 A. 263 (1936).
62 Faire v. State, 58 Ala. 74 (1877).
63 State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389 (1946). For examples of sufficient circumstances, see Rayburn v. State, 200 Ark. 914, 141 S.W.2d 532 (1940); Commonwealth v.
Millen, 289 Mass. 441, 194 N.E. 463 (1935); and State v. Bryan, 69 Ohio App. 306, 43
N.E.2d 625 (1942).
64 Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S.W. 390, 393 (1916).
65 27 Cal. App.2d 236, 80 P.2d 1012 (1938).
66 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963).
67 Id. at 930-31. Accord, People v. Kerridge, 20 Mich. App. 184, 173 N.W.2d 789
(1969), where, during a felony trial, a defendant, who insisted on shouting obscenities and was
otherwise uncooperative, was ordered gagged and shackled.
68 380 Mich. 100, 155 N.W.2d 850 (1968).
69 Blair v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 319, 188 S.W. 390 (1916).

[Vol. 46:760]

NOTES

basis for the court to exercise its discretionary option to have him shackled, there
is some question as to the scope of inquiry by the court. Matters that occur before
the trial were, at first, considered beyond the scope of the court's inquiry. In
State v. Kring0 the defendant had assaulted a person in court three months
before the trial in question. The court held that knowledge of such an incident
would not authorize the court to assume that he would be guilty of similar misconduct when he was on trial for his life. The judge's decision had to be based on
71
either the conduct of the prisoner at trial or the evidence offered at trial.
There is a distinct group of cases where the judge has taken judicial notice
of facts generally known within the limits of its jurisdiction. The defendant in
such cases has been a known dangerous criminal. In Makley -v. State"2 the
defendant was a member of the notorious John Dillinger gang and an escaped
convict. Previously he had participated in breaking into the county jail to free
John Dillinger. The sheriff had been killed in the jailbreak. Facts of the defendant's criminal exploits had also been revealed at the trial of an accomplice."
The prisoner was required to remain shackled throughout the trial while a
military guard was maintained at the courthouse and jail. Nonmiltary guards
were used in the courtroom as an extra precaution. A pass system was used for
admission to the trial, and persons were searched before admission to the courtroom was permitted. In upholding such extraordinary precautions the court
quoted the opinion in the case of Barnett V.State74 that "what we know as men,
having common knowledge.., we cannot ignore as judges."7
The modem view does not limit the factors influencing the judge's decision
to the trial itself. Knowledge obtained from the sheriff that the defendant has
made a desperate effort to escape at gunpoint,76 or that the defendant was bent
on self-destruction and would very likely try to secure some deputy's pistol in
order to force the officers to kill him 7 is sufficient to justify having the defendant
manacled. The record, however, must disclose sufficient facts to make it clear that
such action was warranted by the court.
Reliance by the trial judge solely on the opinion of the sheriff may be considered an abdication, rather than an exercise of, discretion."8 The sheriff's duty is
to keep the prisoner in safe custody, but his opinion on shackling defendants
should be supported by some satisfactory evidence that creates a reasonable belief
that restraint is necessary in court. A judge's reliance on the affidavit of a sheriff
has been upheld, however, as:
[M]erely giving proper heed, as he had the right to do, to the sheriff's
knowledge of the record, tendencies and character of appellant and to his
recommendation as an officer of the court, in relation to the necessity of
70 64 Mo. 591 (1877).
71 State v. Coursolle, 255 Minn. 384, 97 N.W.2d 472 (1959); State v. Temple, 194 Mo.
237, 92 S.W. 869 (1906).
72 49 Ohio App. 359, 197 N.E. 339 (1934).
73 State v. Pierpont, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264 (1934).
74 104 Ohio St. 298, 310, 135 N.E. 647, 651 (1922).
75 197 N.E. at 346. Accord, State v. Pierpont, 49 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264 (1934).
76 Hall v. State, 199 Ind. 592, 159 N.E. 420 (1928).
77 Gray v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 305, 268 S.W. 941 (1925).
78 State v. Farmer, 90 Ohio App. 49, 103 N.E.2d 289 (1951).
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keeping appellant handcuffed during his trial in order to prevent his escale.70
The sheriff's opinion must, however, be supported by facts that are preserved in
the record."0
In such situations it is usually advisable for the trial judge to take testimony
in regard to the necessity of handcuffs or other restraints.sl The judge should
then state for the record his reasons for imposing restraints. It was expressly
noted in People v. Mendola 2 that failure to follow this practice is not an abuse
of discretion, however, if the record discloses that the sheriff had reasonable cause
for handcuffing the prisoner.
In Loux v.- United States"3 the trial judge ordered a hearing on the use of
restraints when he received pre-trial information that the defendants might attempt to escape during the trial. The hearing disclosed that the courtroom was
not very secure, that the defendants as well as the witnesses had an exceptionally
high propensity toward violence, and that preparations had been made for an
escape.8" As a result of these findings, leg irons, handcuffs, and a belt attaching
the shackles to the chains were used. Such hearings seem to be the fairest way to
adequately determine the necessity of the restraints. However, simply stating
the reasons for the shackles on the record and allowing the defendant to controvert any of the supporting facts would be sufficient.
The courts resorted to the use of physical restraints to enforce the accused's
right to be present at his trial. Restraints were considered an alternative to
violating, or at least risking the possibility of violating, the defendant's right by
expelling him from his own felony trial.
Expulsion had been upheld on the lower court level, however, in some
instances. The Diaz holding had reaffirmed the holding of United States v.
Davis and thereby emphasized the interrelationship between the concepts of
presence and waiver by misconduct. Thus in People v. De Simone,8 ' where the
defendant both left the courtroom of his own volition on several occasions and
was forcibly expelled after making obscene remarks both to the witnesses and
judge, the court specifically stated that his misconduct was an effective waiver
of his right to be present. Although his absence was involuntary in the sense that
he was expelled, it was his voluntary conduct that forced his removal. He chose
to be so deprived of his right.
The rules of presence, waiver, and waiver through misconduct were established yet uncorrelated authoritatively. Jurisdictions that maintained the strict
rules of presence as a mandate under the sixth amendment would go to any
lengths to avoid removal. Defendants in these jurisdictions were subject to being
bound and gagged for misbehaving. The Supreme Court had not approved this
as a constitutionally permissible alternative. In courts where voluntary waiver
was recognized. in regard to insignificant parts of the trial and where presence was
79
80

State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389, 406 (1946).
Woodards v. Maxwell, 303 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Ohio 1969).

81
82

People v. Mendola, 2 N.Y.2d 270, 140 N.E.2d 353, 159 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1957).
Id. at 277, 140 N.E.2d at 356, 159 N.Y.S.2d at 478.

83
84
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389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 919.
9 111. 2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
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conditioned oh proper conduct, the judges were hesitant to banish a defendant.
The fear was that he would miss some significant event of the trial or that the
dictum in Snyder v. Massachusetts"-would not withstand the force of an actual
case. Such was the state of the law before the decision in Illinois v. Allen."'
V. Decorum in the Courtroom Versus the Defendant's Right To Be
Present at Trial-Illinois v. Allen
The accepted rules were subjected to their severest'test to date . in the Allen
case. Allen had been convicted of a non-capital felony. During the trial he had
been excluded because of his disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful -conduct.
The exclusion took place without any initial physical restraint 'being imposed on
Allen. In this case of first impression, the Supreme Court'held, -in an explicit
-overruling of the court of appeals' position; that the. right of a contumacious
defendant to be present was not absolute. 9 The Court, through Justice Black,
-made it clear that it was rejecting the dicta of both Hopt and Lewis in favor of
the dictum in Snyder. Because of this, it became obvious that the Brookhart v.
Janis,90 and Barber v. Page"' formulation of an effective waiver was now encompassed within, and in retrospect had foreshadowed, the Allen holding. Brookhart indicated, although it did not so hold, that a defendant's constitutional right
to confrontation could be effectively waived. The Court stated that there was a
presumption against such a waiver. For a waiver to be effective it must be clearly
established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right 2 within the Johnson v. Zerbst formulation for waiver." The Allen
mandate to the courts includes the duty to warn a defendant of a court's power
to punish disruptive acts. This warning would appear to be the factor upon
which both knowledge and intentional relinquishment of the right could be
founded should the disruptive conduct be continued.
The Allen Court expressly noted that the right could be reclaimed as soon as
the defendant agreed to behave. The Court thus reaffirmed the statements of
United States v. Davis made 101 years earlier.
In addition to removing a disruptive defendant, the Court enumerated two
other alternatives: (1) cite the defendant for contempt, or (2) bind and gag
him. The priority of the alternatives depends on the circumstances'of the individual case.
The contempt remedy seems to be the least offensive alternative, although it
may eventually prove to be the least efficacious in many circumstances. A defendant who desires to be a martyr may not be dissuaded by, a court's threat to
cite him for contempt. A defendant who believes that the ultimate result of a
86 291 U.S. at 106. The dictum is to the fact that the privilege may be lost, through misconduct.
87 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
88 But see Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
89 397 U.S. at 342.
90 384 U.S. 1 (1965).
91 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
92 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4.. See also Harlan's separate opinion in Brookhatt. Id.

at 8-10.
93

304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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trial will be jail for him is not going to be intimidated by the threat of a jail
sentence for contempt. In fact, the accused may believe that it would be to his
advantage" to delay the trial for a while. The political climate may change or
witnesses iiay become unavailable. Thus, the remedy which logically should be
considered first may very well be the one disregarded in order to uphold the words
of the Court that "neither in criminal cases nor in civil cases will the law allow
a person to take advantage of his own wrong."94 This is, however, by no means a
foregone conclusion meant to preclude the contempt power as a viable alternative.
Preferably it should be invoked as the least likely to offend the dignity of the
court or the administration of the judicial process.
Although binding and gagging a defendant was enumerated first, it would
appear from the text of the opinion to be the least desirable in the Court's view
since it is mentioned as a remedy of "last resort."95 This alternative alone would
seem to be the most inconsistent with the "decorum and respect inherent in the
concept of courts and judicial proceedings."9
The use of restraints brings with it the inherent danger of prejudice. The
determination to be weighed here is the resultant prejudice to the case that is
caused by having the accused appear in shackles before the jury. In some circumstances shackles and gags are degrading and pernicious in the minds of some,
but to others, and in different circumstances, shackles would create sympathy
and favorY The defendant's appearance could result in prejudicing either his
own or the prosecution's case before the jury. The real danger is the erosion of
the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The connotation of guilt is
certainly manifest in the bound and gagged defendant who appears by his very
condition to have already been judged guilty by the court prior to the rendition
of the verdict by the jury. 8
To bind and gag a defendant is to ignore the fundamental reasons behind
the presence concept. The Supreme Court has said in a recent case:
Mr. Justice Holmes stated no more than a truism when he observed that
"Any judge who has sat with juries knows that, in spite of forms, they are
extremely likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere." 99
Certainly the spectacle of a defendant in bondage--especially one who was still
struggling-would upstage and overshadow to a degree the testimony being
rendered before the court. Assuredly the jury would guess at the reasons for the
defendant's struggle, at the same time sacrificing that degree of attention or concentration that might be necessary to discern the credibility of the witness on the
stand that may ultimately prove crucial to the decision. An erroneous determination of guilt, or degree of guilt, through a juror's fear or conjecture cannot be
obviated by observing that the defendant caused the spectacle himself.
94 397 U.S. at 350.
95 Id. at 344.
96 Id. at 343.
97 Lee v. State, 51 Miss. 566, 574 (1875).
98 In State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 593 (1877) it is stated that "the jury must necessarily
conceive a prejudice against the accused, as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man,
and one not to be trusted, even under the surveillance of officers."
99 Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965).
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The Court has often noted with respect to the confrontation clause that:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits... being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in
which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand
face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by
his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.i °°
The effect of a face-to-face confrontation is diminished to the extent the accused
is handicapped by shackles and gags. The demeanor of the accused is considered
to be of such importance that where the effects of drugs may have communicated
a damaging impression of the accused's attitude to the jury the case has been
reversed." 1 The accused may virtually be turned into a witness against himself
by being forced to remain before the court in an unnatural state. The inquiry
would then be whether the court was compelling him to incriminate himself
against his will. It may be true that he brought the actions upon himself, but
now that there is a recognized alternative of removal it would seem that the court
in binding and gagging him would be forcing him to accept a condition that
would tend to incriminate him after he has waived the right to be present. If
it is true that actions speak louder than words, then the defendant should condemn himself by his own actions, and not be condemned by those of the court.
One court has so eloquently put the case against shackling that its words
serve to point up the paradox inherent in the maintenance of dignity through
shackling:
Though biologically speaking, man may be an animal, it was never intended
that he be treated as such in the realm of criminal jurisprudence. If we
permitted the subjection of man to such treatment before the courts of our
land, we have paved the way for him to be tried while tied to a log or in
a steel cage, as well as chains and shackles. Barbarism has been-abandoned
and must never be permitted
to creep back through the crevices created by
10 2
lenient rules of law.
If such statements are adequate justification for a defendant to have the right
to make his initial appearance free from shackles, it logically follows that, given
the right to counsel and the power of the court to remove him for misconduct,
such reasons militate against ever using such methods even as a last resort. It is
difficult to envision the case where it would be "the fairest and most reasonable
way to handle a defendant."' 1 3 This course of conduct has caused one judge to
observe that:
100 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
101 State v. Murphy, 56 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960). But see People v. Guillor,
178 Cal. App.2d 854, 3 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1960); and People v. Rogers, 150 Cal. App.2d 403,
309 P.2d 949 (1957).
102 French v. State, 377 P.2d 501, 504 (Okla. Crim. 1963). See also Eaddy v. People, 115
Colo. 488, 492, 174 P.2d 717, 718 (1946).
103 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970).
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Shackles, chains, gags and a courtroom full of deputy marshals engaged in
trying to keep the defendants off the floor may prove to be the climax in
following "the proper course." I cannot believe that the Federal Constitu10 4
tion requires that any such farce take place.

Removal of a defendant from his trial may be the better method'of achieving
a fair adjudication of the issues. The historical basis for the necessity of a defendant's presence has been eroded to the point where presence is more a formalized right than an absolutely inviolate right. Presupposing the right to counsel
and the continued ability to communicate with him after removal, the right of
the court to remove the defendant does not fail to surmount the historical basis
for the rule. The right should be maintained, however, wherever possible, for any
beneficial effect that might accrue from the face-to-face confrontation. Part of
the rationale for requiring the accused to be present, at least when the verdict
was returned, was predicated on the idea that he would have an opportunity to
poll the jury.'0 5 Thus he could personally see that the verdict was individually
sanctioned by the jurors. He stood face-to-face not only with the witnesses, but
also with his triers.' The psychical effect of that confrontation may be, in itself,
enough to insure an honest determination. That the right to be present can be
waived or forfeited by defendant's misconduct can no longer be doubted. The
voluntary misconduct in effect constitutes a waiver of the right to be present
even though, paradoxically, his ultimate absence is involuntarily enforced on him.
The search for alternatives to removal has encompassed a wide variety of
methods to ameliorate the absence of the defendant. Sound-proof, enclosed glass
booths,0'° closed-circuit television, radio, tapes of the proceedings, and an anteroom with one-way glass and a telephonic connection to counsel have all been
suggested. The Supreme Court seemed to leave an opening for the consideration
of such technological assistance in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion.'
The
point for consideration, then, would seem to be the feasibility, rather than the
permissibility, of such systems.
Booths of glass or plastic conjure up spectres of the Eichmann trial. The
idea of keeping a man in a cage is foreign to our system, and certainly subject
to the same criticisms as binding and gagging an accused. The expense of constructing such booths would seem to be one practical limitation on their useespecially in the poorer or smaller jurisdictions. Their effectiveness in controlling
a contumacious defendant is also open to serious question since the 1958

Merkouris sanity trial where the accused first tried to smash the booth with a
chair and later feigned sleep.'
104 United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1"969) (Hasting, J.,
dissenting).
105 State v. Hughes, 2 Ala. 102, 36 Am. Dec. 411 (1841); Harriman v. State, 2 Greene
270 (Iowa 1849); People v. Perkins, I Wend. 91 (N.Y. 1828); Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio
472 (1842).
106 A verdict rendered in the absence of the accused has been considered so erroneous that
it could not be cured even by reassembling the jury, with their consent, after they had rendered
their verdict - and had been once discharged. Cook v. State, 60 Ala. 39 (1877).
107 A description of the booth used in the Merkouris sanity trial can be found in NawswEFK, Mar. 2, 1970, at 26.
108 397 U.S: at 351 ".. . to mitigate the disadvantages of his expulsion as far as technologically possible in the circumstances."
109 NEwswEEx, Mar. 2, 1970, at 26.
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Technological systems designed to provide some mechanical presence, if not
physical presence, seem to be, a more viable and acceptable alternative than
booths or binding and gagging. At lea~t in this way the defendant still' retains
the benefits of any aid he can lend to his counsel in the defense or cross-examination. Furthermore, the prosecution, or the entire judicial process, retains. the
benefit of an accurate, fair determination through the adversary process as exercised at near capacity.
VI. Decorum in the Courtroom Versus the Defendant's Right To Be
Present at Trial-The Trial Judge's Duty and Responsibility
The primary responsibility for the maintenance of dignity and decorum
within the judicial process has to rest with the court. The judge is responsible
for the peaceful progress of the trial, and no one else can make a better determination of what the accused's demeanor will necessitate in order to insure a fair and
impartial trial. This is an awesome responsibility in view of the court's discretionary power to remove the defendant, cite him for contempt, or order him
bound and gagged. The lack of definitive standards as to what conduct warrants
a contempt citation and what warrants removal or shackling subjects this power
to a greater potential for abuse through misapplication or misunderstanding. It
has to be recognized as the judge's duty to adequately inform and warn those
before his court of the necessary standard of conduct and the nature and extent
1
of his power to deal with any and all violations of that standard."
To effectively
waive
a
right,
the
defendant
must
know
of
the
right
and
must
intend
to so waive
it. 11
The judge, too, must understand the function and application of his powers.
The American College of Trial Lawyers notes that:
The power of a judge to punish contempt committed in his presence is not
designed to protect his own dignity or person, but to protect the rights of
litigants and the public by ensuring
that the administration of justice shall
2
not be thwarted or obstructed."
The judge should exercise his power consistently, efficiently, and impartially, as
called for by the circumstances presently before the court. The expeditious and
efficient judge, in handling an obstreperous person during the course of a trial,
must do all that is humanly possible to avoid prejudicing the defendant's caseeither for or against him. An attitude of impartiality, and an absolute refusal to
become embroiled in a controversy, should be the hallmarks of the judge's
function in the administrative process.
The lawyer's function is primarily to insure that his client does not, through
miscalculation or misapprehension of the nature or extent of the rules, waive his
constitutional right through misconduct. A lawyer should, pragmatically, seek
to restrain his client from any conduct which could create a prejudicial effect on
110 Such a warning appears to be required by Illinois v. Allen. See 397 U.S. at 343, 350.
111 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
112 Disruption of the Judicial Process) Report and Recommendation of the American
College of Trial Lawyers, 75 CASES & COMMENT No. 5, at 34, (1970).
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the jury and disrupt the fair administration of the judicial system.11 It would
seem that the lawyer is in the best position to exert such a restraining influence
upon his client. The lawyer's duty should be in addition to the court's duty to
warn; his duty, however, never replaces, but only supplements, the trial judge's
rule.
VII.

Conclusion

In light of the social and political climate prevalent in America, there does
not appear to be the likelihood that disruption will be abandoned as a trial tactic
by militant defendants. The Allen case is the significant decision that will shape
the policy to deal with such tactics. The effectiveness of the courts in administering the constitutionally permissible methods to control the disruptions will depend
on the development of a recognized consensus as to the viability of each alternative in given circumstances. Historically, the justification for the alternatives
is recognized, but the future nature of our judicial process may very well depend
on the post-Allen application of the court's power.
Raymond H. Seitz
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